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Fads in Fear :
Cycles in Crime Construction
Joel Best
Crime Waves
There is a sequence familiar to all students of the media’s crime coverage.
First, something—perhaps a particularly terrible crime, or pronouncements
from activists or politicians, or a rumor, or even a fairly routine news story
—draws attention to some form of criminality. The media then begin to fo-
cus on this crime problem: they watch for additional instances about which
they can report ; they consult experts who pontificate about the problem’s
causes and recommend solutions; and they provide a forum for victims, wor-
ried citizens, law enforcement officials, prosecutors and defense attorneys,
legislators, even the criminals themselves—anyone moved to speak out on
the issue. All of this coverage conveys a sense that the problem is already
bad and rapidly getting worse; people begin to speak of a “crime wave.” If
this crime can be constructed in sufficiently melodramatic terms, coverage
will spread from the news media to “info-tainment”—that is, to talk shows,
reality tv, and other news/show business hybrids—and even to such pure
entertainment genres as detective novels, feature films, and comic books.
Eventually, of course, this particular story becomes stale, old news; coverage
dwindles, and the media turn their attention to some fresh topic.
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We could point to countless examples of crime coverage following this tra-
jectory. Within the last forty years, for instance, Americans have worried
about bath salts（Kavanaugh & Biggers, 2019）, carjacking（Cherbonneau
& Copes, 2003）, child abductions（Best, 1990）, crack（Brownstein, 1996）,
crystal meth（Jenkins, 1999）, cyber porn and cyberstalking（Potter & Potter,
2001）, date rape（Gilbert 1994）, daycare center sexual abuse（de Young,
2004）, drive-by shootings（Ramos 1998）, drunk driving（Gusfield, 1981）,
Ecstacy（Jenkins, 1999）, freeway violence（Best,1991）, gangs and gang in-
itiation rites（Best & Hutchinson, 1996）, fentanyl（Kennedy and Coelho,
2020）, hate crimes（Jenness & Grattet, 2001）, human trafficking（Bernstein,
2010）, identity theft（Levi 2001）, the knockout game（Best, 2019）, media
piracy（Yar, 2005）, militias（Chermak, 2002）, pedophile priests（Jenkins,
1996）, road rage（Best & Furedi, 2001）, satanic ritual abuse（Victor 1993）,
school and mass shootings（Burns & Crawford, 1999）, serial murder
（Jenkins, 1994）, sexual predators（Jenkins, 1998）, stalking（Lowney & Best,
1995）, terrorism（Jenkins, 2003）, transgender violence（Westbrook, 2021）,
wilding（Welch, Price & Yankey, 2002）, and workplace violence（Burns,
2001）—to list just some of the crime problems that emerged, peaked, and–
for the most part—have already slipped into relative obscur
（１）
ity. The same
（１） In composing this list, I limited myself to crime waves that emerged in
the United States after 1980. Expanding the focus in various ways could
have produced a much longer list. For example, there were somewhat ear-
lier waves of concern ; child pornography, domestic violence, PCP, rape, and
child sexual abuse are among the crime problems that began attracting in-
tense attention during the 1970s. I also have ignored recent claims that fo-
cused on non-criminal issues, including the numerous waves of concern over
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pattern is repeated across time and space—Londoners, for instance, have a
long history of worrying about disorderly youth subcultures, such as Mo-
hawks in the eighteenth century（Statt, 1995）, hooligans in the nineteenth
（Pearson, 1983）, and skinheads in the twentieth（Brake, 1974）.
The media coverage of these crime waves tends to be credulous; that is,
it assumes that a crisis exists. In contrast, sociologists, criminologists, and
other scholars often are more skeptical, although their analyses usually fo-
cus on the content of the particular claims. That is, when they’re dealing
with claims about serial murder, they ask how and why serial murder has
emerged as a topic of concern ; when road rage is in the news, they try to
explain its celebrity. Thus, most case studies of crime waves subject specific
claims to careful, critical examination, precisely because the analysts con-
sider those claims dubious. In some cases, it can take time for skepticism
to emerge, particularly when the initial claims evoke the analysts’ sympa-
thies. Sociologists—like journalists, politicians, and members of the general
public—can get caught up in the alarm over some new social problem. For
example, claims about violence against women or hate crimes—offenses in-
volving victims whom sociologists are likely to view as sympathetic figures
—tend to be slower to attract skeptical analyses than, say, the newest drug
scare. But, if the concern lasts long enough, skeptical critics are likely to
emerge.
These critical case studies point to a larger pattern; most analysts recog-
personality disorder. And, of course, it would be possible to list many topics
that attracted considerably more attention in other countries than in Amer-
ica. All of the sources that I have cited adopt a constructionist stance ; that
is, they focus on how and why these crimes became topics of concern.
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nize that such concerns tend to be cyclical. Criminologists generally view
crime waves as waves in media coverage, more than waves in actual crimi-
nal
（２）
ity. They speak of moral panics, drug scares, and contemporary legends
—terms that convey doubts about the reality of the threat at hand. They rec-
ognize that different concerns tend to follow similar trajectories, even
though they almost always focus their attention on the particular case in the
headlines.
My goal in this paper is to step back from the particular, to try and offer
a more general perspective on crime waves. I intend to pay relatively little
attention to the details of case studies, and to concentrate on two larger is-
（２）The classic account of the media’s role is Lincoln Steffens’s（1931）de-
scription of his experiences as a Progressive-era reporter : “I Make a Crime
Wave.” Case studies describe the media’s production of crime waves in the
eighteenth（King, 1987）, nineteenth（Adler, 1996）, and twentieth centuries
（Fishman, 1978）The hallmark of the media-generated crime wave is its
specificity ; that is, the press insists that there is a wave in some particular
crime（such as school shootings）. The evidence for this claims is almost
always anecdotal ; the claims point to a few visible incidents as proof that this
crime is increasing. Very often, the relevant statistics do not bear this out
（for instance, all the available statistical evidence suggested that school
shootings declined during the 1990s, yet the media claimed that there was
a wave of school shootings in 1998 and 1999［Best, 2004］）. Criminologists
who trace patterns of criminality over time, however, do find that there are
periods when crime rates rise and fall ; in some cases, these analysts speak
of crime waves（LaFree, 1999 ; Sacco, 2005）. Their explanations for these
shifts tend to focus on demographic factors（e.g., when the population’s pro-
portion of young males［the most criminally active segment of the popula-
tion］rises, crime rates often increase）or economic factors（e.g., the boom-
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sues: first, I want to explore the connections among different crime waves;
and, second, I want to consider the faddish nature of these concerns.
Connections among Crime Waves
Anyone who studies crime waves notes that today’s new concern often
bears a family resemblance to other, historical crises. Beginning in the nine-
teenth century, for example, Americans have experienced repeated drug
scares, characterized by dire warnings about the dangers posed by some
new drug problem. At particular historical moments, concern has focused
on alcohol（“Demon Rum”）, opium smoking, morphine, cocaine, heroin,
marijuana, LSD and other hallucinogens, amphetamines, PCP, crack, Ec-
stacy and other club drugs, crystal meth, bath salts, and—most recently—
prescription opioids（Jenkins, 1999; Musto, 1999）. Some of these drugs had
only brief moments in the limelight ; others have returned to center stage
on several occasions. Typically, each new drug scare features warnings that
this drug is different than other, once-frightening-but-now-familiar drugs,
that this new drug is more powerful, more damaging, that it threatens to
spread widely and do untold damage（Reinarman, 1994）.
There are many other examples of such “families” of crime waves. Ameri-
cans find it very easy to worry about children menaced by deviants—child
abuse, child pornography, child abductions, school shootings, and the like
（Best, 1990）—and about random violence—such as workplace violence,
drive-by shootings, or freeway violence（Best, 1999）. I don’t mean to sug-
gest that these aren’t concerns in other countries, just that we need to be
alert to the possibility that different concerns tend to pop up in different
places. For example, East Africa has experienced waves of concern about
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vampires—one worry that does not really resonate in the U.S.（White, 20
（３）
00）.
It seems to me that such recurring concerns point to what we might think
of as cultural fault li
（４）
nes. Thus, a culture may characterize children as pre-
cious, vulnerable innocents, who need and deserve protection from harms.
While every culture doubtless values children, this thememay become espe-
cially prominent in contemporary societies that have managed to reduce
childhood death rates（via requiring vaccination, the use of car seats, and
so on）, so that fewer people have direct experience with children suffering
terrible harms, and there is a taken-for-granted expectation that children can
and ought to be protected from serious threats. At the same time, declining
birth rates mean that families invest their hopes in fewer children, so that
each child is defined as priceless, and the loss of a child becomes an awful,
almost unimaginable tragedy（Zelizer, 1985）. In this context, claims that so-
ciety is failing to protect its children become rhetorically powerful（Best,
1990）. It is easier to construct crime problems that speak to such underly-
ing cultural issues. Mapping these cultural fault lines can not only help us
understand why crime waves emerged in the past, it may also help us pre-
dict what sorts of issues are likely to emerge in the future.
A related phenomenon is the cyclical emergence of the same concern at
different historical periods. For example, during the twentieth century,
（３） Similar concerns can emerge in settings separated by considerable time
or space. For instance, alarms that someone was stabbing or cutting people
at random emerged in late eighteenth-century London（Bondeson, 2001）, as
well as pre-World War II Halifax（Goss, 1987）and post-war Taipei（Jacobs,
1965）.
（４） Erikson（1976）uses a somewhat different image : “axes of variation” to
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Americans experienced three intense waves of concern about youth gangs:
first during the late 1920s and early 1930s; again during the 1950s; and then
during the late 1980s and early 1990s（Gilbert, 1986）. Each period featured
extensive news coverage, and each inspired a body of social scientific re-
search, as well as movies, novels, and other popular cultural depictions of
gang life.
Gangs are by no means the only example of such recurring concerns. The
historian Philip Jenkins has published several books tracking the rise and
fall of various public issues in the United States. His examples include sex
crimes involving child victims（also the subject of three twentieth-century
waves of intense concern, interspersed with periods when the threat was
downplayed）（Jenkins, 1998）, the dangers of new religious cults（Jenkins,
2000）, and even theologians getting periodically caught up in the idea that
religious authorities have ignored “hidden gospels” that reveal that Christ’s
teachings have been misapplied（Jenkins, 2001）. Reading Jenkins’s work
drives home some clear lessons. First, it is not uncommon for Americans
to display a pattern of oscillating concern : that is, there are periods when
gangs, sex crimes against children, or whatever become the focus of intense
public alarm, interspersed by periods when these threats receive far less at-
tention.
Collective Amnesia and Crime
Second, there is a sort of collective amnesia—people not only don’t ac-
knowledge this cyclical pattern, but they generally don’t recall that there
were earlier periods when today’s menace also aroused widespread alarm.
Rather, there seems to be nostalgia for the Good Old Days when people did-
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n’t have to worry about all the terrible problems that plague us today. We
envision a past when children used to be safe from victimization. And,
should a critic point out that, say, people used to worry about gangs, those
earlier fears are dismissed as naive. In the 1950s, we’ll be told, people wor-
ried about rumbles between youths armed with switchblade knives and
home-made zip guns, but today we fear gangs who engage in drive-by shoot-
ings using automatic weapons. The past’s fears are dismissed as quaint.
Thus, we see a pattern. Society—at least American society, but I am as-
suming this probably occurs elsewhere in the world—becomes repeatedly
aroused about the same problems—drugs, gangs, threats to children, what-
ever. And, each time this occurs, people downplay—even completely ignore
—the fact that this concern has a history, that it has been the subject for
alarm in the past.
This is not a trivial observation. We can easily imagine other possible pat-
terns. After all, the common-sense—or perhaps I should say the idealistic
—interpretation of journalism is that the news media report on the most sig-
nificant recent events ; according to this model, if the media cover crime
waves, it must be because there has been a real increase in some sort of
crime. The recognition that crime and coverage vary independently—that
many crimes waves are really media creations—is itself important.
Moreover, the fact that these waves tend to focus on the same topics,
rather than, say, addressing a random array of crimes, suggests that there
are cultural fault lines, issues about which it is relatively easy to arouse con-
cern. We can suspect that different cultures might have different key con-
cerns, which helps explain why reports of foreign crime waves may strike
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And, finally, the observation that waves of concern—sometimes quite in-
tense—soon fall out of collective memory seems interesting. There are ex-
ceptions, of course. Americans’ collective memory recalls the 1950s anti-
communist crusade led by Senator Joseph McCarthy and its excesses ;
McCarthyism continues to be referenced as an example of irresponsibly
arousing political fears. But the great bulk of moral panics, crime waves, and
drug scares turn out to be episodes of short-lived concern.
The Importance of Fads
It is this short-lived quality to which I want to turn. Sociologists have a
natural tendency to focus on what endures ; after all, what lasts is presum-
ably important. As a result, a good deal of sociological research examines
social institutions, social structures, values, and other aspects of social life
that seem largely stable. To be sure, sociologists are also interested in social
change, but the great theorists of change—Marx, Durkheim, and Weber—
sought to explain long-term, enduring changes, and most modern sociolo-
gists share this concern. For example, there is a rather large sociological
literature on diffusion, which is the name social scientists give to the process
by which things—ideas, objects, whatever—spread from one group to an-
other. Much of the diffusion literature implicitly assumes that diffusion is
desirable, that it represents progress and will endure, that once some inno-
vation has been adopted, people will continue to use it, at least until some-
thing clearly better comes along（Rogers, 1995）. In short, sociologists tend
to presume that what’s important is what lasts, and that what lasts must
therefore be important.
In contrast, sociologists tend to pay less attention to transitory, ephemeral,
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short-lived phenomena. Most of these are relegated to the category of col-
lective behavior, which is a conceptual mish-mash. Sociologists usually in-
clude, within the broader category of collective behavior, riots, crowds, so-
cial movements, disasters, rumors, fashion, and fads. This miscellany is jus-
tified as belonging to the same category on the grounds that these are all
phenomena that seem relatively ungoverned by social institutions. Which
means, of course, that these tend to be short-lived phenomena. Not surpris-
ingly, collective behavior—with its focus on the transitory—has been a rela-
tively low-prestige specialty within the larger discipline of sociology.
And within the low-rent domain of collective behavior, the study of fads
has usually been seen as especially unimportant. The most familiar exam-
ples of fads are playful enthusiasms of young people—toy fads（such as the
hula hoop）, dance fads（such as the twist）, and campus fads（such as streak-
ing）. Thus, the very examples that come to mind when sociologists speak
of fads make the topic seem unworthy of serious consideration. Even collec-
tive behavior textbooks define fads using terms such as “trifling,” “insignifi-
cant,” and “trivial”（Goode, 1992; Miller, 2000）.
My own view is that fads are not just common, but also consequential
（Best, 2006）. Our most serious institutions—including science, medicine,
education, and management—display what I call institutional fads. These
are short-term enthusiasms that take hold among serious people, so that
physicians adopt fad diagnoses and fad treatments, educators get caught up
in educational fads, just as managers endorse management fads. Anyone
who follows the news realizes that it is not at all uncommon for future devel-
opments to be heralded with great fanfare, yet never come to pass. Rather,
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scene）, surging（when people scramble to adopt the innovation）, followed
by purging（as adopters abandon what they previously seized with such en-
thusiasm）.
Conditions Fostering Fads
But what do fads have to do with the media’s coverage of crime prob-
lems? If, as I have already argued, that coverage reveals a pattern of short-
term fascination with particular crimes, then we can suspect that crime
waves—that is, waves of media coverage about specific crimes—resemble
other short-lived enthusiasms, such as fads. We might then ask how what
we know about fads can help us better understand the media’s issue-atten-
tion cycles, not just about crime, but about all manner of other social issues.
I want to begin by considering the culture and social structure that foster
fads in general and, I will argue, the media’s fascination with crime waves in
particular. Fads flourish where the culture celebrates change and the possi-
bility of progress, and where the social structure features decentralized insti-
tutions. These conditions encourage the emergence of innovations that
have the potential to spread. In particular, a media environment that offers
lots of alternative sources for information, each placing a premium on nov-
elty（and the very word “news” suggests that the media’s focus is on what’s
new）, will be receptive to fads. In recent years, the development of multiple
24-hour cable news networks and the Internet have made it vastly easier to
promote all sorts of news stories to very large audiences.
These media developments display at least two themes that deserve spe-
cial mention. The first is the increasing tendency of the media to adopt a
form of the sociological imagination. That term, of course, was devised by
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C. Wright Mills（1959）, who argued that the social sciences offered a way
of linking private troubles to public issues : thus, instead of viewing my in-
ability to find work as a personal problem, we can focus on the broader phe-
nomenon of unemployment. The sociological imagination, then, shifts our
attention from the particular case, to some larger social condition. Consider
the first notorious crime story in American journalism history—the 1836 axe
murder of Helen Jewitt, a New York City prostitute（Schiller, 1981; Tucher,
1994）. Jewitt died just as the penny press newspapers were emerging, and
the media devoted unprecedented amounts of attention to her life and death.
Vast amounts of ink were consumed describing her story and that of her kil-
ler, but this pre-sociological coverage treated her murder as a terrible inci-
dent—not as an instance of a larger problem.
Contrast today’s coverage of terrible crimes. In 2006, there was a shoot-
ing in Quebec: a man entered a high school and shot twenty people, killing
one, before being shot himself. This was a sensational story, particularly in
Canada. An American sociologist I know who happened to be in Canada at
the time sent friends an e-mail message complaining of “the onslaught of
wretched, pseudo-sociological explanations for a statistical anomaly.” These
included claims about lax gun control laws, violent video games, goth cul-
ture, the marginalization of immigrants, a culture grown insensitive to vio-
lence, vampire fans, and Quebec’s “alienating, . . . decades-long linguistic
struggle”（Cornacchia, 2006; Dougherty, 2006; Mandel, 2006; Rocha, 2006;
Wong, 2006）. That is, rather than covering the crime as an awful event, the
media immediately began searching for the larger social problem that the
killings represen
（５）
ted. Inspired by a single incident, they imagined a crime
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sion talk shows, where hosts interview people whose lives have taken some
dramatic turn, and present those folks as embodiments of a larger phenome-
non, e.g., “Men Who Have Sex with Their Babysitters.” The media version
of the sociological imagination means that virtually any crime story has the
potential to inspire a crime wave.
The second consequence of the proliferation in media venues is the ease
with which alternative, often conspiratorial narratives can spread. The 1960s
provided a series of shocks to American political culture: three major assas-
sinations, extensive social protests and rioting, numerous revelations that
government and business had lied, and so on. No doubt there had always
been a paranoid strain in the culture, expressed in conspiratorial thinking
（Hofstadter, 1966）. But the assassination of President Kennedy seemed to
launch a new era, in which event after event became the subject of unending
speculation about what really happened. In recent decades, social scientists
have studied all manner of stories that endure in folk culture and alternative
media, and even, on occasion, break into mainstream news coverage. Con-
sider, for example, claims that U.S. authorities store all the evidence of flying
saucers in the mysterious Area 51, that the World Trade Center buildings
only collapsed because explosive charges, previously implanted in the struc-
tures, were detonated, or—in the current QAnon claims—that pedophile, Sa-
tan-worshipping, cannibalistic Democrats are smuggling children through
a vast network of underground tunnels. Such notions prove almost impossi-
ble to discredit; whatever contrary evidence is offered can be dismissed as
further proof of the conspiracy’s reach. The powerful conspiracy whose
（５） Violent crime waves are often characterized by multiple claimants offer-
ing such competing explanations（Best 1991, 1999）.
論
説
法と政治 72巻 1号 （2021年 5月） 357（357）
workings can be detected by discovering the links among apparently unre-
lated bits of information has become a major theme in popular fiction, televi-
sion and film, and other popular culture.
These alternative explanations also influence how we think about crime
waves. Popular culture formulas require that heroes confront dangerous,
powerful villains, which encourages the portrayal of fictional criminals who
are far more powerful than their real-life counterparts. In turn, we begin to
imagine that terrible, real crimes must be the work of powerful villains, that
reality must mirror our fictional formulas. Similarly, rumors and folklore in-
voke the theme of the powerful conspiracy to explain crime waves. For in-
stance, there are tales that the CIA or other government agencies deliber-
ately introduced crack and HIV into black ghettoes（Sasson, 1995）. The pro-
liferation of media forums—such as cable channels, radio talk shows, and
Web sites aimed at homogeneous, sympathetic audiences—makes it quite
easy for these claims to circulate among those who find them compelling,
and of course social media only exacerbate this process. The mainstream
American news media—that is, the network news programs, and the major
newspapers and newsmagazines—devoted almost no attention to the con-
cerns about satanic ritual abuse. Nonetheless, a satanic panic flourished
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, thanks to religious publishing houses
and broadcasters, as well as to the more sensational secular talk shows.
Crime Waves as Fads
In other words, the cultural and structural arrangements that encourage
constantly shifting attention to all manner of fads also affect the media’s
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that characterizes all fads, which we can describe as a three-stage process :
emerging, surging, and purging.
Fads in crime coverage can emerge for various reasons. Here, we can
think of the media as a marketplace, in which all manner of stories compete
for attention. Whether a particular story takes off depends upon the compe-
tition. It can be almost impossible to draw attention to a new topic when ri-
val stories are sufficiently compelling. For instance, crime news went
largely uncovered in the days immediately following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, when network television devoted 24-hour, commercial-free
coverage to that story, and newspapers used most of their space for the same
purpose. In contrast, reporters speak of the “dog days” of summer, when
news seems hard to come by. A good share of American crime waves seems
to begin during those slow summer months.
Of course, it also helps to have a melodramatic event that can serve as a
typifying example for the crime wave. Thus, the crack problem was
launched when a prominent athlete died of a cocaine overdose, just as the
abduction of a Utah teenager from her home in 2002 revived concerns over
missing children. There is, of course, no need for the typifying example of
be in any statistical sense typical : the more extraordinary the event, the
more it arouses fear and other intense emotions, the easier it is to inspire
attention to a broader crime problem that, in reality, consists largely of far
more mundane incidents.
Similarly, it is easier for a crime wave to emerge if the problem can be con-
structed as somehow relevant to what I’ve called cultural fault lines. Threats
to children, out-of-control youth, and the pernicious consequences of immi-
gration are all familiar motifs—larger concerns that may be depicted as re-
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lated to the specific crime being addressed. Crimes receive more attention
when they can be linked to such compelling concerns.
In some cases, crime waves are products of the press’s entrepreneurial
activities; reporters’ coverage may launch the process（Best, 1991）. But, in
other cases, advocates guide what happens. Philip Jenkins（1994）, for in-
stance, has explained how the modern fascination with serial murder was
very much the product of an FBI campaign that used the threat of serial mur-
derers to justify the introduction of a potentially controversial federal data-
base for crime information. In still other cases, advocates may latch on to
stories introduced through news coverage; such coverage seems to have led
domestic violence activists to realize that they could use news about stalking
to revive interest in the movement for women’s shelters（Lowney & Best,
1995）.
The second stage—surging—involves a rapid expansion of interest in the
newly discovered crime problem. Here, various media outlets clamber
aboard the bandwagon, sensing that they, too, can extend the story in some
way. This can take various forms: most obviously, one can point to additional
cases as evidence that there is a trend, a wave of increasing crime, but there
are other possibilities. For instance, reporters can show that the crime ex-
tends into previously unrecognized corners of society, or that it is taking new
forms, or that it has important consequences, or whatever. When crime sto-
ries straddle major cultural fault lines, the media may discover that advo-
cates of various causes are standing by, eager to link the current concern to
their ongoing issues—such as the availability of firearms, or the corrupting
influence of popular culture on the young. There are all sorts of ways to ring
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still. Crime waves are like sharks : if they stop moving forward, they will
die. Additional coverage is needed. Remember that there are always com-
peting claims hoping to attract media attention.
One important form of surging involves spreading the crime wave to alter-
native media. In particular, successful crime waves make the transition into
popular culture. They find their way into both info-tainment and pure enter-
tainment（such as comic books, detective novels, and television series）
（Fishman & Cavender, 1998）. This is important because popular culture
—and not just those forms that claim to be “ripped from the headlines”—can
keep awareness of a crime wave going, even after the news media can no
longer justify remaining focused on the topic.
But, of course, all fads die—it is their short life-span, after all, that charac-
terizes them as fads. Crime waves enter the third stage—purging—when
the media can no longer identify and exploit new angles, when the story be-
gins to seem stale, familiar, no longer novel enough to merit coverage. This
process often occurs unannounced and unnoticed. Rather, the media turn
to other topics—perhaps a new crime story, perhaps something entirely dif-
ferent for a while. Often their shift in coverage is aided by an event that
makes some new topic seem much more compelling and newsworthy, so
that the media can justify turning their attention to what’s new, often without
bothering to acknowledge that their new focus is replacing the topic that
previously held their attention. It is this silence that makes purging the least
-studied aspect of fads. It is only later, when tracing media coverage on an
issue, that we discover that it emerged, surged, and then—well—the topic
seems to have been purged from the media’s agenda.
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Conclusion
It can be satisfying to conduct case studies of crime waves. Such studies
allow analysts to debunk widely held beliefs; this in itself often attracts audi-
ences larger than those captured by most scholarly work. People are inter-
ested to discover that their fears are exaggerated, that they have been ma-
nipulated by the agendas of the media and various advocates. In addition,
crime waves tend to be short-lived, which can make it relatively easy to
gather the relevant data and conduct analysis. No wonder that we have ac-
cumulated a substantial stock of such case studies.
My point, however, has been that we need to move beyond case studies,
to pay more attention to the larger patterns in the media’s coverage of these
short-lived stories. In particular, I think analyses of media crime coverage
can benefit from borrowing ideas from studies of other short-lived phenom-
ena, including analyses of fads. Examining both the circumstances that fos-
ter the spread of fads and the processes that compose fads’ trajectory offers
insights for better understanding crime waves, drug scares, and other moral
panics. Thankfully, most of these fears are short-lived. It might be worth-
while to consider more systematically just why this is the case.
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Crime waves involve concentrated media and public attention on forms
of crime that are said to be particularly common or threatening. Sociolo-
gists and criminologists often view these as waves of attention, rather than
criminality; they seek to explain these episodes as the product of claims
made by the media, officials, or activists. Focusing on particular cases ig-
nores the connections among crime waves that reflect similar underlying
cultural concerns. Many crimes tend to fall into and out of attention over
time, although collective amnesia tends to obscure this fact. It makes sense
to view crime waves as a form of fad. Fads are short-lived enthusiasms; al-
though we tend to think of fads as trivial, they can be found in major insti-
tutions. Institutional fads are fostered by decentralization, and the prolifera-
tion of media platforms encourages both the adoption of a sociological
imagination that views particular crimes as instances of larger problems,
as well as conspiratorial explanations. The stages in a fad’s career—emerg-
ing, surging and purging—can help us understand the dynamics of crime
waves, so that we can move beyond the focus on particular crime problems.
論
説
法と政治 72巻 1号 （2021年 5月） 367（367）
